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Trusts and Estates 
by Joseph S. Brock* 
During the period covered by this review little in the way 
of trends or departures differing from established positions 
seems to have appeared; there is much repetition and emphasis 
of "black-letter law". There are, however, in several cases 
unusual factual patterns which are of interest. The results of 
these cases, interesting and of course contributing to the 
normal growth of case law, seem to flow naturally and quite 
easily from principles long-established and accepted, not de-
parting from what could be expected. 
There were several statutory changes, prominent among 
which were the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 
effective July 1, 1968, as well as statutory provisions which 
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are applicable in estates where allocation and apportionment 
problems are not troublesome. 
Trusts 
Trusts Involving Convicts Serving Life Sentences 
Hillnwn v. Stults l is a case presenting an unusual factual 
pattern in that it involves a wealthy convict who created a 
trust as a method of holding and conserving his large property 
interests while serving a sentence in San Quentin. 
Hillman owned extensive ranch holdings in San Luis Obispo 
County. In January, 1955, he murdered his wife and in 
April, 1955, during the murder trial, he appointed his sister 
guardian of his children. She then also took possession of his 
separate property. To administer the property, Hillman and 
his sister later decided to set up a simple trust, and a letter 
was addressed by the sister to Hillman in which she stated 
that although a deed and bill of sale purported to convey 
absolute ownership to her, she nevertheless held the property 
in trust for him. 
Hillman and his sister had disputes concerning the admin-
istration of the ranch properties and in September, 1959, he 
applied to the Adult Authority for permission to petition for 
the appointment of his attorneys as conservators of his prop-
erty in San Luis Obispo County. This permission was granted 
and in January, 1960, the San Luis Obispo Superior Court 
appointed Hillman's attorneys as conservators of the property. 
In May, 1960, the conservators filed an action to establish 
title to the property, to declare a trust, and to compel a con-
veyance and accounting of the property deeded and conveyed 
to the sister in June, 1955. 
On February 23, 1962, Hillman was released on parole 
and appeared and testified at the trial. The following June 
the court made an interlocutory judgment holding that the 
property was held in trust by the sister and ordered an account-
ing and reference. In its final judgment in May, 1965, the 
1. 263 Cal. App.2d 848, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 295 (1968). 
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court decreed the trust terminated and found that the defend-
ant sister had breached her trust. 
The appeal involved several arguments. Among them was 
the argument that Hillman was civilly dead and lacked the 
capacity to create any trust because of his conviction and 
sentence to life imprisonment, and thus the orders of the 
Adult Authority and the San Luis Obispo Superior Court 
were void and in excess of their jurisdiction. In discussing 
this problem, the appellate court cited and quoted California 
Penal Code section 2601.2 The section does, indeed, provide 
that a person sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison 
for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead. It adds, however, 
that the Adult Authority may restore to such person during 
his imprisonment such civil rights as the authority may deem 
proper, and the section preserves the convict's right to inherit 
real and personal property. 
As to Hillman's capacity, the court held that his limited 
restoration to civil rights came within the framework of the 
constitutional plan permitting limited civil rights for inmates 
and parolees, and that this power of the Adult Authority was 
not related to the pardoning power of the governor. Further-
more, when the legislature prohibited a prisoner from becom-
ing a trustee of a trust it did not deny him the right to become 
a beneficiary. 
The argument made that the State of California was a 
necessary or indispensable party to the litigation was without 
merit. The court then added that the trial court's grant of 
authority to Hillman to file his supplementary complaint as 
real party in interest in place of conservator was approved: 
The Adult Authority did not exceed its jurisdiction when 
it partially restored [Hillman's] civil rights: (1) To 
2. Cal. Penal Code § 260 I: "A per-
son sentenced to imprisonment in the 
state prison for I ife is thereafter deemed 
civilly dead. But the Adult Authority 
may restore to such person during his 
imprisonment such civil rights as the 
authority may deem proper, except the 
right to act as a trustee, or hold public 
office, or exercise the privilege of an 
elector, or give a general power of 
attorney. This section shall not be 
construed so as to deprive such person 
of his right to inherit real and personal 
property in accordance with the laws 
of this State. 
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execute the deed and bill of sale to implement the trust 
(June 14,1955); (2) To sign a petition for conservator-
ship (September 24, 1959); (3) Gave permission to 
plaintiff to substitute as party plaintiff (September 13, 
1963).3 
As to whether any trust was created during the early days 
of Hillman's imprisonment, the trial court found that the 
trust was founded on an express agreement; i.e., the letter 
addressed to Hillman by his sister. If, however, for any rea-
son the trust could not have been recognized as an express 
trust, it could have been considered a resulting trust for equi-
table reasons. The appellate court pointed out that the real 
issue before the trial court was simply whether a trust was 
created, not whether it was an express, resulting or construc-
tive trust. The pretrial order permitted the court to find 
anyone of the three types of trust and provided that "This 
suit is one to . . . (b) Impress a trust on said property, 
( d) Compel a conveyance and transfer of said real 
and personal property respectively from Defendants, Stults, 
to Plaintiff, Hillman.,,4 The court observed that a resulting 
trust would avoid the effects of any possible innocent illegal 
transactions and would effectuate the original intentions of 
the parties. It further observed that a trust was consonant 
with the original intentions of the parties. Aside from the 
express written evidence, however, the intent of the brother 
and sister could be inferred from the circumstances of Hill-
man's predicament. This was a classic simple trust expressed 
in a letter specifying that the property was vested in the 
sister for the benefit of the brother while he was in prison. 
The appellants attacked the conservatorship granted by 
the San Luis Obispo Superior Court on the basis that the 
court had no jurisdiction, since Hillman was a prison inmate 
and was not a resident of San Luis Obispo County. The 
appellate court remarked that it was aware of no cases which 
interpreted conservatorship provisions for prisoners or parol-
ees. Section 2051 of the Probate Code provides that con-
3. 263 Cal. App.2d at 866, 70 Cal. 4. 263 Cal. App.2d at 868, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. at 305. Rptr. at 306. 
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servatorship proceedings for a California resident are to be 
instituted in the superior court in the county of the residence 
of the proposed conservatee. 5 In this case, Hillman was a 
long-time resident of San Luis Obispo County and was invol-
untarily removed to various prisons outside his home county. 
Prisoners do not gain or lose residence as a result of being 
removed to the prison system.6 The meaning of residence in 
these sections is synonymous with domicil. 7 Furthermore, 
the location of the property, the situs of the leases, and the 
permanent home of Hillman in that county made it the 
practical venue for the conservatorship. 
The appellate court further stated that a prison inmate 
or parolee is not required to abandon his property. While 
the Adult Authority has control over the person of the inmate, 
his outside property does not come within its administration, 
nor does the Adult Authority have facilities for its super-
vision or control. The court commented that the appellants 
were correct in saying that conservatorship was either very 
rare or unknown among prison inmates. It may be, the 
court added, that prisoners have not utilized conservatorships 
for the reason that most felons have little or no property 
and that it is very unusual for anyone with the financial 
resources of Hillman to be confined in state prison. In any 
5. Cal. Probate Code § 2051: "Con-
servatorship proceedings for a resident 
of this State shaH be instituted in the 
superior court in the county of the resi-
dence of the proposed conserv-
atee .... " 
6. Constitution of California, Art. II 
§ 4: "For the purpose of voting, no 
person shall be deemed to have gained 
or lost a residence by reason of his 
presence or absence while employed in 
the service of the United States, nor 
while engaged in the navigation of the 
waters of this State or of the United 
States, or of the high seas; nor while 
a student at any seminary of learning; 
nor while kept at any almshouse or 
o:her asylum, at public expense; nor 
while confined in any public prison." 
Cal. Elections Code § 14,283: "A 
person does not gain or lose residence 
solely by reason of his presence at or 
absence from a place while employed in 
the service of the United States or of 
this State, nor while engaged in navi-
gation, nor while a student of any in-
stitution of learning, nor while kept 
in an almshouse, asylum or prison. 
This section shall not be construed to 
prevent a student at an institution of 
learning from qualifying as an elector 
in the locality where he resides while 
attending that institution, when in fact 
the s~udent has abandoned his former 
residence." 
7. Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235, 
288 P.2d 497 (1955). 
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event, the court held that where conservatorships are specified 
in case of certain physical and mental disabilities by Probate 
Code section 1751,8 the further provisions of that section 
are that conservatorships are available where for "cause [one] 
is unable properly to care for his property or who 
voluntarily requests the same and to the satisfaction of the 
court establishes good cause therefor." The statute protects 
individuals who are handicapped by disabilities other than 
mental. Here the disability was a physical restriction which 
prevented Hillman from managing his property. 
Charitable Trusts 
Because of the well-known property involved, "The Irvine 
Ranch", as well as the law in connection with the issues raised, 
the case of Smith v. The James Irvine Foundation,9 is of 
interest. The plaintiff in the action was an heir at law and 
a beneficiary under the will of James Irvine who was her 
paternal grandfather. She asked that certain shares of corpo-
rate stock of The Irvine Company standing in the name of 
The James Irvine Foundation be held to be part of the 
estate of the decedent, James Irvine. Since plaintiff was a 
citizen of Virginia, whereas all defendants were residents 
of California, the suit was brought in federal court with federal 
jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship. 
The stock involved in this litigation was the majority stock 
of The Irvine Company, a corporation having large assets, 
the largest being a tract of land known as The Irvine Ranch. 
The ranch consisted of approximately 88,000 acres in Orange 
8. Cal. Probate Code § 1751: "Upon 
petition as provided in this chapter, the 
superior court, if satisfied by sufficient 
evidence of the need therefor, shall ap-
point a conservator of the person and 
property or person or property of any 
adult person who by reason of ad-
vanced age, illness, injury, mental weak-
ness, intemperance, addiction to drugs 
or other disability, or other cause is 
unable properly to care for himself or 
for his property, or who for said 
444 CAL LAW 1969 
causes or for any other cause is likely 
to be deceived or imposed upon by 
artful or designing persons, or for 
whom a guardian could be appointed 
under Division 4 of this code, or who 
voluntarily requests the same and to 
the satisfaction of the court establishes 
good cause therefor. The court, in its 
discretion, may appoint one or more 
conservators." 
9. 277 F.Supp. 774 (D.C. [1967]). 
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County and had an estimated worth of one-half billion to a 
billion and one-half dollars. James Irvine succeeded to the 
ownership of the ranch on the death of his father in 1886, 
and in 1894 he caused The Irvine Company to be incorporated. 
Its capital stock consisted of 1,000 shares of common stock, all 
of which, except the qualifying shares, were issued to him, and 
these he owned by endorsement. James Irvine transferred 
the ownership of the ranch to the corporation although he 
remained president of the corporation until his death in 
August, 1947. 
In 1936 J ames Irvine caused The J ames Irvine Foundation 
to be incorporated under the laws of California. He was 
never an officer or director of the foundation. On February 
24, 1937 , James Irvine executed an indenture of trust in 
which the foundation was designated as trustee. The inden-
ture stated that he transferred, assigned and set over to 
the trustee certain shares of stock of The Irvine Company; 
he later added five more shares. The company later redeemed 
some of its shares and at the present time there are 855 shares 
of its stock outstanding of which 459 shares stand in the 
name of The James Irvine Foundation. The status of these 
shares was the subject of this litigation. 
The will of James Irvine was admitted to probate and a 
decree of final distribution was entered by the superior court 
in San Francisco on December 29, 1952. The shares of stock 
referred to in the trust indenture were not administered in 
the estate proceedings nor included in the decree of distribu-
tion, and the plaintiff claimed that this stock should have 
been included in the distribution of the property of the estate 
and asked that it be held to be part of the estate assets. The 
defendants asked that the stock in question be held to be 
the property of The James Irvine Foundation and that the 
trust be held to be a valid charitable trust. 
The indenture of trust between J ames Irvine and The James 
Irvine Foundation provided that the trustor, James Irvine, 
could revoke the trust in whole or in part and could withdraw 
from the trust all or any part of the property, including the 
stocks. In addition, he reserved for his lifetime all income 
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from the trust property and the right to vote all the shares 
of stock held in the trust, as well as the right to direct the 
investment of any liquidating dividends and proceeds or profits 
from the corpus of the trust property. The trustor bound 
himself during his lifetime to pay all taxes, assessments, insur-
ance and care-cost of the trust property. Irvine provided 
that after his death the balance of income, after certain deduc-
tions, should be used for any charitable purpose in California, 
as authorized in the articles of incorporation of the trustee, 
but that it should not be used for charities having substantial 
support through taxation. 
After the death of James Irvine, the secretary of the founda-
tion sent in the stock certificates, which had been endorsed 
in blank by Irvine, for transfer to the foundation. A stock 
certificate for the shares was thereupon issued to The James 
Irvine Foundation. 
The plaintiff contended that the indenture of trust was 
void as an attempted testamentary disposition by James Irvine; 
that the trust indenture contained both charitable and non-
charitable provisions rendering the indenture void in its en-
tirety; that the trust indenture was void and created no trust 
because it conveyed neither legal nor equitable title to the 
Irvine stock in praesenti; that there was no delivery of the 
stock or the indenture by James Irvine to the foundation, as 
trustee, until after his death; and that after his death the stock 
descended to his heirs. 
The court held that the stock had not been transferred 
on the stock record book of the company and that James 
Irvine was the only person entitled to vote those shares 
but that he had reserved that right in the indenture and he 
could not have voted them had they been transferred. But 
as between James Irvine and The James Irvine Foundation 
the fact that the shares had not been transferred on the stock 
record book was not determinative as to their respective 
interests. The court further found that the indenture of trust 
was delivered to the foundation by James Irvine and that the 
certificates of stock had been delivered by him to the founda-
tion during his lifetime. 
446 CAL LAW 1969 
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The plaintiff contended that the trust indenture suspended 
the power of alienation of the corpus of the trust in perpetuity 
and therefore was invalid because of the rule against perpetui-
ties. The court pointed out that the State Constitution pro-
hibits perpetuities except for eleemosynary purposes. 10 The 
rule is well-established in California that trusts for charitable 
uses are eleemosynary in purpose and therefore are without 
the scope of the rule against perpetuities.ll 
The plaintiff further contended that the charitable and non-
charitable provisions of the indenture of trust were so insepa-
rably blended as to deny the trust the status of a charitable 
trust. Under California law a trust which permits the trustee 
to devote the funds to both charitable and non-charitable 
purposes is in violation of the rule against perpetuities.12 The 
theory of the plaintiff was that under paragraph 2 of the 
indenture/3 the board of directors of the foundation might 
in their uncontrolled discretion continually invest all of the 
income from the corpus and thus freeze all such income 
into the corpus and thereby negate the use of income for 
charitable uses. The court said that in the indenture of trust, 
it was stated that the purpose of the trust was to assist 
California charities. The articles of incorporation of the 
foundation stated the same purpose, and the two documents 
were closely related. The manifest objective of James Irvine 
in incorporating the foundation and in executing the indenture 
of trust was to make it possible for a substantial part of his 
10. California Constitution, Article 
XX § 9. 
11. Smith v. The James Irvine Foun-
dation, 277 F.Supp. 774 at 793 (1967). 
12. Estate of Sutro, 155 Cal. 727, 
102 P. 920 (1909); Estate of Kline, 138 
Cal. App. 514, 32 P.2d 677 (1934). 
13. In the paragraph preceding para-
graph 2, provision is made for deduc-
tions from the income of the corpus 
of the trust for administrative expenses 
and to make good or replace losses 
suffered in the corpus of the trust. 
Paragraph 2 then provides as follows: 
"2. Out of the balance of said income, 
after the deductions hereinabove pro-
vided, the Trustee may, and in the 
judgment of the Trustor should, each 
year set aside such sum as the Board 
of Directors of the Trustee shall in its 
sound discretion deem wise and ex-
pedient for investment, and said 
Trustee shall invest the same in ac-
cordance with subparagraph 3 of the 
powers hereinafter enumerated, which 
said investments, when made, shall be-
come a part of the corpus or principal 
of the trust property, and the income 
and profits therefrom shall thereafter 
be used, applied and devoted as in this 
trust provided." 
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property to be devoted to the assistance of California charities. 
In addition, under California code provisions the Attorney 
General is charged with supervision of charitable trustS.14 
The court held that the trust was a valid one for charitable 
uses under the California law exempting such trusts from 
the rule against perpetuities. 
The plaintiff then contended that the indenture of trust 
was invalid because under the indenture The James Irvine 
Foundation became the owner of the majority of the shares 
of The Irvine Company and look control of that company, 
including its dividend policies. Thus, the plaintiff asserted, 
such control would give rise to a conflict of fiduciary duties 
in the use of the income of The Irvine Company in regard 
to whether the income would be allocated to private commer-
cial use or use by the foundation for charitable purposes. 
The court commented that the plaintiff's contention actually 
encompassed the broad general question as to whether owner-
ship by a charitable corporation of the majority of voting 
stock in a private commercial corporation is contrary to 
pubic policy. The court said that if the legislature deemed 
that gifts or bequests carrying with them the control of private 
commercial corporations were contrary to public policy, it 
could prohibit such corporations from receiving such gifts 
or bequests. The legislature, however, has not done so, and 
no California cases are cited which hold that this is contrary 
to public policy. Accordingly, the court held that the inden-
ture of trust was not illegal as being contrary to public policy. 
Another of plaintiff's contentions was that the indenture 
did not create a trust as to the Irvine stock but merely created 
an agency which was revoked by his death and also that 
the trust created an attempted testamentary disposition of 
the stock. The court cited and discussed a number of Cali-
fornia cases15 in which it pointed out the distinction between 
14. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 9505 and 
10207. 
Uniform Supervision of Trustees for 
Charitable Purposes Act, Cal. Gov. 
Code §§ 12580-12595. 
15. Monell v. College of Physicians 
448 CA L LAW 1969 
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v. Bank of America National Trust & 
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After reviewing the cases, the court held that the transfers 
of stock by James Irvine were not testamentary in character 
and that the foundation was not a mere agent. 
The court held that it seems clear under California law 
that the delivery of an endorsed certificate of stock is sufficient 
to effect a valid transfer of the shares of stock represented by 
the certificate.16 The court, after reviewing all of plaintiff's 
contentions, found none of them well founded and denied 
her the relief sought. 
Another case of interest in the area of charitable trusts 
is that of Hart v. County of Los Angeles.17 The case involved 
an action for declaratory relief, forfeiture, and an accounting 
arising out of the last will and testament of silent screen star 
William S. Hart, Sr., who died in 1946, leaving a will designat-
ing the defendant county as the primary beneficiary under 
two trusts. The plaintiff was the only son of the testator, 
and he contended that the county had not performed the 
conditions under the decree of distribution and had thereby 
forfeited its rights under the will. The will provided that 
if the county failed to meet the conditions imposed, the prop-
erty should revert to the state for the same uses and purposes. 
The plaintiff alleged that the state would not accept the 
property or trusts and, therefore, that he was entitled to the 
property as though his deceased father had died intestate. 
The court pointed out that the county holds the property 
as trustee of a charitable trust for the benefit of the public 
in general. 1S The court will not allow such a trust to fail 
because of the actions of the trustee but will appoint a suc-
cessor trustee if the appointed trustee is not performing his 
duties. If performance by a political entity as trustee is re-
quired by some of the trust provisions and no willing political 
entity can be found, the doctrine of cy pres may be invoked 
to carry out the manifest intent of the testator. In this case 
16. Stone v. Greene, 181 Cal. 569, 17. 260 Cal. App.2d 512, 67 Cal. 
185 P. 670 (1919); Burkett v. Doty, Rptr. 242 (1968). 
176 Cal. 89, 167 P. 518 (1916); and 18. Estate of Hart, 151 Cal. App.2d 
Driscoll v. Driscoll, 143 Cal. 528, 77 271, 311 P.2d 605 (1957). 
P. 471 (1904). 
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the will had indicated that the testator's intent was that the 
property was to continue in trust for the benefit of the public 
and that it was not to return to the son since he had been 
provided for during the testator's life. 
The Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Pur-
poses Ace9 requires that the Attorney General supervise the 
activities of trustees administering trusts of a charitable nature. 
The plaintiff cited Government Code, section 1258320 for the 
proposition that the Attorney General had no power to bring 
a suit against the county to compel compliance with the 
terms of a trust but, representing the cestui qui, the Attorney 
General must have standing as a member of the public at 
large to bring the suit. But the court noted that Government 
Code, section 12591, reads in part ". . . The powers and 
duties of the Attorney General provided in this article are 
in addition to his existing powers and duties. . . ." The 
court added that even though the county itself is exempt 
from the reporting duties under the act, it is not any more 
immune from suit by the Attorney General than it would have 
been under common law before the uniform act.1 
Constructive Trusts 
There were a few cases of interest in the area of construc-
tive trusts In Cramer v. Biddison,2 the court was involved 
with a judgment of divorce which incorporated a stipulation 
of the parties to the effect that: 
Defendant shall maintain insurance on his own life 
with death benefits of not less than $15,000.00 for each 
of the minor children, or a total of $45,000.00. Said 
insurance shall be maintained until the child in question 
reaches the age of majority or completes his or her 
college education, whichever first occurs. For the pur-
19. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12580-12596. 
20. Cal. Gov. Code § 12583: "This 
article does not apply to . . . any 
state, . . . or to any of their 
agencies or governmental subdivisions. 
" 
450 CAL LAW 1969 
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pose of convenience, plaintiff shall remain the primary 
beneficiary under said policy or policies, and the respec-
tive child shall become the secondary beneficiary.3 
After the divorce, Hummer, who was the defendant in the 
case, made his estate the beneficiary of all his life insurance 
policies except of one $12,000 policy of which his former 
wife was beneficiary. At the time of his death his three chil-
dren were still minors, and none of them had graduated 
from col1ege. This was an action to establish a constructive 
trust to enforce the insurance provision of the divorce judg-
ment. The appellant prayed that respondent executors of 
Hummer's estate be declared constructive trustees of $33,000, 
that she be allowed to trace the funds into the estate, and that 
she be given a deficiency judgment for sums not capable of 
being traced. 
The court held that imposition of a constructive trust is 
authorized by section 2224 of the Civil Code.4 The court 
said that the elements of a cause of action under this section 
are three; the existence of a thing, plaintiff's right to the 
thing, and defendant's gain of that thing by fraud. The 
property was sufficiently identified to be impressed with a 
trust since the fruits of the policies, rather than the policies 
themselves are what are sought, and the proof of the "existence 
of the tree on which they grew seems to us to be a matter 
for trial.,,6 
The complaint alleged a wrongful act since it alleged that 
Hummer changed beneficiaries on all his policies and there-
fore that he changed it on those on which the divorce judg-
ment required plaintiff to be carried as beneficiary. Respond-
ents charged that the first cause of action was ambiguous 
and uncertain in averring both that the proceeds were payable 
to Hummer's estate and that the executors were constructive 
3. 257 Cal. App.2d at 723, 65 Cal. thereto, an involuntary trustee of the 
Rptr. at 625. thing gained, for the benefit of the 
4. Cal. Civil Code § 2224: "One who person who would otherwise have 
gains a thing by fraud, accident, mis- had it." 
take, undue influence, the violation of 5. 257 Cal. App.2d at 724, 65 Cal. 
a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless Rptr. at 626. 
he has some other and better right 
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trustees of the proceeds. The court pointed out that the 
constructive trust is an equitable remedy and that one is not 
entitled to it because one has legal title to property belonging 
to another but rather because one has an equitable right to 
property though legal title stands in another. 
The court held that the general demurrers to the second, 
third and fourth causes of action were properly sustained 
and that the acts alleged by appellant to have been wrongful 
acts of respondents were consistent with the performance of 
their duties as Hummer's executors. By alleging that the 
policies were payable to the estate, appellant alleged a fact 
which, if proved, would have protected respondents from 
liability to appellant in the absence of a judicial determination 
that the proceeds were actually hers. When respondents per-
formed the acts which the appellant complained of, the estate 
was beneficiary. In overruling the demurrer to the first count 
the court held that it was merely recognizing that the appel-
lant had pleaded a justiciable claim to the property. 
The opinion of Mr. Justice Herndon concurred with the 
majority in holding that the first cause of action alleged 
facts sufficient to state a cause of action. He dissented, how-
ever, from the holding that the facts in the second, third, 
and fourth causes of action were not sufficient to state a cause 
of action against respondents. The dissenting opinion stated 
that it may be that the executors acted properly in collecting 
the proceeds of all insurance policies as the majority opinion 
held. But it does not follow that they were justified in paying 
out the insurance proceeds adversely claimed by appellant to 
discharge estate debts prior to appropriate adjudication. If 
appellant's claim to the proceeds was ultimately found valid, 
then the executors received and held these proceeds as the 
trustees of a constructive trust. To the extent that the appel-
lant's adverse claim was valid, she was in equity the true 
beneficiary of the insurance policy as well as the beneficiary 
of the resulting constructive trust. 
The executors should not have disbursed the fund in ques-
tion without awaiting an adjUdication of the validity of appel-
lant's claim and would have been well advised to have filed a 
petition for instructions in the probate proceedings. 
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Judge Herndon added that in the more realistic modern 
concept of probate jurisdiction, as recently enunciated in 
Estate of Baglione,6 it is probable that the ownership of the 
fund could have been decided in the probate proceedings. 
But even if it were held that the Probate Court lacked juris-
diction, it would have directed the executors to proceed in the 
proper forum. 
The dissenting opinion would have reversed the order of 
dismissal on all counts. 
Problems with Trustees 
In the Estate of Bullock,7 the court had occasion to rule 
that the superior court, in probate, has jurisdiction to hear 
and determine a petition by beneficiaries for instructions as 
to whether the beneficiaries may ask for the removal of trustees 
without invoking an in terrorem clause in the will which had 
set up the trust under which they claim. 
The will of Margaret Bullock had been admitted to probate 
in 1952. It contained a no-contest clause in the usual form, 
providing that if any devisee, legatee or beneficiary under the 
will or anyone entitled to share in the estate through intestate 
succession were to attack the will, such a contestant would 
receive only one dollar. Several trusts were created and the 
estate assets were distributed to the sole trustee who filed his 
eleventh account current and report as to certain trusts. Due 
to some irregularities, the beneficiaries believed that the trus-
tee was not suited to be sole trustee. They petitioned the 
Probate Court for instructions as to whether an action by them 
for removal of the trustee pursuant to sections 2233, 2282 
and 2283 of the Civil CodeS would bring into operation the 
no-contest clause of the will. The beneficiaries appealed from 
an order that the Probate Court had no jurisdiction in the 
6. 65 Cal.2d 192, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139, 
417 P.2d 683 (1966). 
7. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
239 (1968). 
8. Cal. Civil Code §§ 2233, 2282 and 
2283 provide in effect that a trustee who 
has violated or is unfit to execute the 
trust, or who acquires any interest, or 
becomes charged with any duty, adverse 
to the interest of his beneficiary or the 
subject to the trust, may be removed at 
once. 
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matter. Their contention was that the petition was denied 
solely because of lack of jurisdiction. As there was doubt that 
such an order was appealable, the beneficiaries in a separate 
proceeding requested a writ of mandate to compel the Probate 
Court to hear and determine the petition for instructions. 
The court pointed out that section 1120 of the Probate 
Code9 has been liberally interpreted by the courts. The court 
stated that the beneficiaries' action to oust the trustee was 
not necessarily in opposition to the will or the trust thereunder. 
Frowning on any proceeding which deterred an interested 
party from resorting to the Probate Court in proper cases, 
the court stressed the importance of maintaining access to the 
courts with the least possible obstruction. The court even 
suggested a moral duty not to stand silently by and accept 
what is given by the trustee knowing it to be the wrong 
amount. 10 
With reference to the particular application of Probate Code 
section 1120, the court cited Estate of Smithll to the effect 
that the language of that section was broad enough to give 
the Probate Court jurisdiction over practically all con-
troversies arising between trustees and beneficiaries and that 
the beneficiary was entitled to petition the court for instruc-
tions to the trustee.12 
The court dismissed the appeal from the order below deny-
ing jurisdiction of the Probate Court and ordered that a 
peremptory writ of mandate issue to the superior court in 
9. Cal. Probate Code § 1120 pro-
vides: "When a trust created by a will 
continues after distribution, the su-
perior court shall not lose jurisdiction 
of the estate by final distribution, but 
shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose 
of determining to whom the property 
shall pass and be delivered upon final 
or partial termination of the trust, to 
the extent that such determination is 
not concluded by the decree of distribu-
tion, of settling the accounts and passing 
upon the acts of the trustee, of author-
izing the trustee to accept additions to 
the trust from sources other than the 
454 CAL LAW 1969 
estate of the decedent, and for the 
other purposes hereinafter set forth. 
. . . The trustee may also petition 
such court, from time to time, for in-
structions as to the administration of 
the trust . . .". 
10. In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa 
98, 17 N.W.2d 129, 157 A.L.R. 584 
(1945); Estate of Seipel, 130 Cal. App. 
273, 19 P.2d 808 (1933). 
11. 4 Cal. App.2d 548, 41 P.2d 565 
(1935). 
12. 4 Cal. App.2d at 553, 41 P.2d at 
568. 
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probate requiring it to hear and determine the issues raised 
by the beneficiaries' petition. 
Wills 
Holographic Wills 
In Estate of Callahan,13 a holographic will was admitted to 
probate, and a contest of the will was filed within six months 
on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influ-
ence, fraud, and lack of due execution. The last ground of 
contest was presented as a separate issue, the other issues 
being reserved, pending its determination. The appellate 
court held the will legally sufficient in its execution and form 
and reversed the superior court's order revoking probate with 
directions to try the other issues.14 Upon retrial, judgment of 
nonsuit was entered at the close of contestants' case, and con-
testants appealed. 
The will consisted of three strips of paper fastened together 
with transparent adhesive tape. The top portion (Sheet A) 
bore the date and made specific gifts, providing for payment 
of taxes from the residue. It ended with an incomplete sen-
tence: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue 
and remainder of my property, whatsoever and wheresoever 
situated,m5 and it appeared that this sheet was cut by scissors 
from a larger page. Sheet Bread: "I will to Helen-Gorge 
[sic]-Willbur-Maurece-the sum of 2000.00 each. I will 
to Margret all my stocks and bonds to have and to hold. "16 
Sheet C appoints Margaret C. Young executrix without bond 
and revokes former wills. The will bore the decedent's signa-
ture at the bottom. Margaret, Helen, George and Maurice 
were all children of a deceased brother of the decedent, and 
all were proponents of the will. 
The court stated that the law applicable to the question of 
whether the proponents' motion for nonsuit was properly 
13. 67 Cal.2d 609, 63 Cal. Rptr. 277, 15. 67 Ca1.2d at 612, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
432 P.2d 965 (1967). at 279, 432 P.2d at 967. 
14. Estate of Callahan, 237 Cal. App. 16. 67 Cal.2d at 612, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 818, 47 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1965). at 279, 432 P.2d at 967. 
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granted was carefully stated by this court in Estate of Lances. 17 
The court then went on to consider the evidence introduced 
by contestants which, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the contestants, was that Sheet B was executed within three 
months before or after January, 1960, and that during that 
period the decedent suffered from senile dementia to the 
extent that she did not know the nature and extent of her 
property, did not understand her relationship to those with 
a claim upon her bounty, and would not understand the nature 
of her act had she undertaken to execute a will. The pro-
ponents argued that such evidence would be insufficient to 
support a jury's finding of lack of testamentary capacity and 
that the nonsuit was properly granted. The supreme court 
did not agree. 
The court addressed itself to the issue of undue influence 
and fraud for the guidance of the trial court upon retrial. 
It pointed out that only the children of decedent's deceased 
brother benefited by the will and that there was no pro-
vision for other deceased siblings. Furthermore, the decedent 
would have been capable of physically integrating Sheet 
B into the will. But the court said that while these facts 
appear sufficient to establish some of the indicia of undue in-
fluence/ 8 they were not enough to establish that Margaret 
Young was active in procuring execution of the will. A con-
testant must show that the influence was brought directly to 
bear upon the testatmentary act. 19 
Ademption 
The question of whether a mere change in the form of 
property, described as a specific bequest in a will, ipso facto 
constitutes an ademption arose in the Estate of Creed. 20 Creed 
owned commercially developed real property. After his wife's 
death he married Pauline. His sole surviving daughter by 
17. 216 Cal. 397, 14 P.2d 768 (1932). 
18. Estate of Yale, 214 Cal. 115, 4 
P.2d 153 (1896); Estate of Lingenfelter, 
38 Cal.2d 571, 241 P.2d 990 (1952). 
19. Estate of Welch, 43 Cal.2d 173, 
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272 P.2d 512 (I954); Estate of Lingen-
felter, 38 Cal.2d 571, 241 P.2d 990 
(1952). 
20. 255 Cal. App.2d 80, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
80 (1967). 
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his previous marriage, Betty, married Melvin Knoll, and there 
were four daughters of this marriage. By holographic will 
Creed specifically devised certain real property to his daughter 
in trust for his four grandchildren and provided a residual 
clause in favor of his wife, Pauline. 
Later, Creed's daughter and her husband became con-
cerned with estate and inheritance taxes on the devise and 
suggested that the real property be transferred to a corpora-
tion and that the corporate stock be transferred to the children 
in tax-free inter-vivos gifts. Such a corporation was formed 
and 465 shares of stock were issued to Creed. Eighteen 
shares were transferred to each of the children, aggregating 
72 shares valued at $33,000. There were 393 shares of the 
corporate stock remaining in Creed's hands at the time of 
his death. 
The decedent's widow, Pauline, contested the right of 
Creed's daughter, as a testamentary trustee, to the distribution 
of the property on the principle that the devise was specific, 
and that ademption had occurred by the inter vivos transfer of 
the real property to the corporation. Since Pauline was the 
residual legatee, she claimed that she was entitled to the 393 
shares of the corporate stock in the estate. The trial court 
awarded the stock to Creed's daughter in trust for the grand-
children. The decedent had dealt with the real property after 
the corporation was created exactly as he had before it was 
transferred to the corporation. 
The court pointed out that a specific devise is not wholly 
extinguished because it is changed in form.1 The general rule 
emerges that a change in form will not work an ademption 
unless the testator so intended. The court indicated that 
while an ademption might be effected when the specific prop-
erty has been sold and the proceeds cannot be traced to other 
property in the estate,2 no such result may be reached in the 
absence of an intent to adeem. Thus it is the extinguishment 
1. Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal. App.2d 2. Estate of Mason, 62 Cal.2d 213, 
592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951); Estate of 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965). 
Helfman, 193 Cal. App.2d 652, 14 Cal. 
Rptr. 482 (1961). 
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of the presence of the property in the testator's estate and the 
circumstances surrounding this event which occur after the 
signing of the will that must be interpreted and decided upon. 
For this purpose the only procedure in determining the tes-
tator's intent is to admit extrinsic evidence upon such intent. 
In Terrorem Clauses 
In Estate of Goyette,3 the decedent, a widower, was not 
survived by parents or lineal descendants, and his nearest 
surviving next of kin were two sisters and a brother. De-
cedent died on January 16, 1964, leaving a will which was 
executed less than six months but more than 30 days prior to 
his death and in which he left a substantial portion of his 
property in trust to a surviving sister and a nonrelative with 
a remainder over, upon the death of the survivor, to re-
spondent charities. The appellants are the children of a 
surviving sister. The residue of the estate was left to 
certain relatives, including the appellants. The will did not 
contain a substitutionary clause in the event the charitable 
gifts should fail. The will did, however, contain an in terrorem 
clause which provided in part: 
Fifth: or should any person whether a bene-
ficiary under this Will or not mentioned herein, con-
test this Will or object to any of its provisions, then to 
such person or persons, I hereby give and bequeath the 
sum of ONE DOLLAR and no more, in lieu of the pro-
vision which I have made or which I might have made 
herein for such person or persons.4 
The appellants filed an objection to the executrix's petition 
for preliminary distribution, alleging that the gift to the 
charities exceeded the limits prescribed by the Probate Code.5 
Respondent's answer asserted that appellants had violated 
testator's in terrorem clause, and thus they could no longer 
object to charitable gifts. The Probate Court agreed with the 
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 768, 66 Cal. Rptr. 4. 258 Cal. App.2d at 771, 66 Cal. 
103 (1968). Rptr. at 105. 
S. See Cal. Probate Code § 41. 
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respondents and ruled that the appellants had forfeited their 
interests in the residuary estate and could not object to the 
alleged excessive gift to the charities. 
In discussing in terrorem clauses, the appellate court com-
mented that such clauses were not against public policy and 
could be used to prohibit legal proceedings designed to thwart 
the testator's wishes. 6 Although forfeiture clauses in wills 
are to be strictly construed, the scope of such a clause de-
pends on the language used by the testator and must be en-
forced according to his clearly expressed intent unless it 
violates a basic statutory policy. The court agreed that the 
appellants violated the in terrorem clause of the will when they 
objected to the petition for preliminary distribution and 
charged a violation of Probate Code section 41. In so ob-
jecting, appellants were not merely seeking a construction' of 
the will, as they attempted to assert, but obviously were at-
tempting to increase the amount of their share of the residue. 
The court agreed further that appellants forfeited their rights 
to challenge the gifts to charities at the same time they for-
feited their residuary share and that these gifts were valid 
even if they collectively exceeded one-third of decedent's 
estate. 
The court, in discussing Probate Code section 41, pointed 
out that that section is not a mortmain statute; the gifts which 
exceed its prescribed limits are not void, but merely voidable 
to the extent that they are excessive,7 and only if challenged 
by a very limited class. Such gifts to charity are valid in their 
entirety if the will contains a substitutional clause giving the 
property to a nonrelative if the gift to charity should fail. 8 
6. Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 101 
P. 443 (1909); Estate of Holtermann, 
206 Cal. App.2d 460, 23 Cal. Rptr. 
685 (1962); Estate of Howard, 68 Cal. 
App.2d 9, 155 P.2d 841 (1945). 
7. Estate of Hughes, 202 Cal. App.2d 
12, 20 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962); Estate of 
Moran, 122 Cal. App.2d 167, 264 P.2d 
598 (1953); Estate of Leymel, 103 Cal. 
App.2d 778, 230 P.2d 48 (1951); Estate 
of Haines, 76 Cal. App.2d 673, 173 P. 
2d 693 (1946). 
8. Estate of Sanderson, 58 Cal.2d 
522, 25 Cal. Rptr. 69, 375 P.2d 37 
(1962). 
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Statutory Changes 
Civil Code 
Income and Principal Generally. The Revised Uniform 
Principal and Income Act, Chapter 2.5 of the Civil Code, 
sections 730 to 730.17, inclusive, was adopted by the legis-
lature in 1967 and became operative July 1, 1968. 
Section 730.02 of the Civil Code provides that a trust 
is to be administered with due regard to the respective in-
terests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen. Three 
standards are set out in this connection: ( 1) it is to be ad-
ministered in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument, 
regardless of the provisions of this chapter; (2) in the absence 
of contrary terms in the trust instrument, then it is to be ad-
ministered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; 
and (3) if neither of the preceding rules is applicable, then 
it is to be administered in accordance with what is reasonable 
and equitable in view of the manner in which men of ordinary 
prudence, discretion and judgment would act in the manage-
ment of their own affairs. This section also provides that 
if the trust instrument gives the trustee discretion, no inference 
of imprudence or partiality arises from the fact that the trustee 
makes an allocation contrary to the provisions of this chapter. 
Section 730.03 sets out in some detail various types of 
income and principal, and section 730.04 states that an in-
come beneficiary is entitled to income from the date specified 
in the trust instrument, or if none is specified, then from 
the date an asset becomes subject to the trust; and in the 
case of an asset which becomes subject to a trust by reason 
of a will, from the date of decedent's death, even though an 
intervening period of time is necessary for estate administra-
tion. 
Treatment of Depletion of Natural Resources Under the 
Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act. The problem of 
depletion of natural resources is provided for in the new sec-
tions of the Civil Code numbered 730.09 to 730.11. As to 
royalties which are governed by section 730.09, if they are 
received as rent on a lease or extension payments on a lease, 
the receipts are income; if they are received from a production 
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payment, the receipts are income to the extent of any factor 
for interest or its equivalent provided in the governing instru-
ment. Allocated to principal shall be the fraction of the 
balance of the receipts which the unrecovered cost of produc-
tion payment bears to the balance owed on the production 
payment, exclusive of any factor for interest or its equivalent; 
and the receipts not allocated to principal are income. If 
received as a royalty or any other interest in minerals or other 
natural resources, receipts not provided for in the preceding 
paragraphs shall be apportioned on a yearly basis in accord-
ance with this paragraph. The receipts shall be allocated en-
tirely to income or apportioned between income and principal 
as the trustee in his absolute discretion may determine, but in 
no event can more than 27-1/2 per cent of the gross receipts 
be added to principal as an allowance for depletion. By its 
terms section 730.09 does not apply to timber, water, soil, 
sod, dirt, turf, or mosses. 
Section 730.10 applies to timber and permits the trustee 
to use his discretion in allotting between principal and income 
receipts from taking timber from land, provided that the 
amount allocated to principal shall not exceed a reasonable 
allowance for depletion. 
By section 730.11, if the principal consists of property sub-
ject to depletion (other than property subject to section 
730.09 or section 730.10) receipts shall be allocated entirely 
to income, or apportioned between income and principal at 
the trustee's absolute discretion, provided that the amount 
allocated to principal shall not exceed a reasonable allow-
ance for depletion. 
Treatment of Corporate Distributions. Section 730.06 
deals with corporate distributions and provides that corporate 
shares of the distributing corporations, including stock splits 
or stock dividends, are principal. The former statute,9 pro-
vided that distributions not of the same kind or rank as the 
shares on which such dividends were paid, to the extent that 
they represented a capitalization of surplus not derived from 
earnings, or distributions in shares of the declaring corporation 
9. Former Cal. Civ. Code § 730.07. 
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of the same kind and rank as the shares on which such divi-
dends were paid, were principal. The new statute provides 
that the right to subscribe to shares or other securities issued 
by the distributing corporation and the proceeds of the sale 
of the right are principal. 
Subsection (c) of section 730.06 deals with investment 
companies distributions and provides that distributions made 
from ordinary income by such companies are income, and all 
other distributions made by such companies including dis-
tributions from capital gains, depreciation, or depletion, are 
principal. The trustee may rely upon any statement of the 
distributing corporation as to the source or character of the 
distribution. 
Charges Against Income and Principal. Section 730.13 
sets forth charges that shall be made against income and 
principal. The charges against income that shall be made 
are: (1) ordinary expenses; (2) a reasonable allowance for 
depreciation at the trustee's absolute discretion, except that 
no allowance shall be made for real property used as a resi-
dence by a beneficiary; (3) one-half of court costs, attorney's 
fees and other fees on periodic judicial accounting, unless the 
court directs otherwise; (4) court costs, attorney's fees and 
other fees on other accountings if the matter primarily con-
cerns the income interest, unless the court directs otherwise; 
(5) one-half the trustee's regular compensation, unless the 
court directs otherwise; (6) expenses reasonably incurred 
for current management; (7) any tax levied upon receipts 
defined as income. If charges against income are of unusual 
amount, the trustee may by means of reserves or other reason-
able means charge them over a reasonable period of time. 
Probate Code 
A noteworthy amendment to Probate Code section 700, 
relating to creditors' claims against a decedent, shortens the 
time for presentation of such claims from six to four months 
after the first publication of the notice to creditors by an 
executor or administrator. 
Probate Code section 930 was amended to provide that 
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where vouchers for any disbursements are proven to have been 
lost or destroyed, to be unavailable in duplicate form, to 
have been paid in good faith, and to have been legal charges 
against the estate, the executor or administrator shall be 
allowed such items. The section has been changed by allowing 
any item of expenditure not exceeding "one hundred dollars 
($100)" instead of "twenty dollars ($20)", and by increas-
ing the maximum total of such allowance to "two thousand 
five hundred dollars ($2,500)" instead of "five hundred dollars 
($500)". 
Section 718 of the Probate Code has been amended by 
adding an alternative course of action for an executor or 
administrator where he doubts the correctness of a claim, or 
where a claim has been wholly or partially rejected or where it 
may be deemed so by the claimant. The personal represen-
tative may now, in addition to the procedure set forth in the 
section prior to the current amendment, enter into an agree-
ment in writing with the claimant to refer the matter in con-
troversy to a commissioner or referee regularly attached to the 
court or to a judge pro tempore designated in the agreement, 
The agreement is then to be filed with the clerk who, with the 
court's approval, is to enter an order referring the matter to the 
person designated. This person, given the powers of a judge 
pro tempore, is to promptly hear and determine the matter by 
summary procedure without pleadings, discovery, or jury 
trial. Judgment is to be entered on the decision and is to be 
as valid as if it had been rendered by a judge of the court in a 
suit commenced by ordinary process. 
In lieu of such an agreement and reference, a judge sitting 
in probate, pursuant to a written agreement of the executor 
or administrator and the claimant, and with the judge's con-
sent, may hear and determine the matter in controversy. 
* 
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